6. The representative of New Zealand said he would introduce the room document before Members proceeded to a question-by-question examination of the substance. He said that, while the group sponsoring this document did not comprise 108 Members, it did consist of Members with significant interests in intellectual property issues and represented a broad geographical diversity, as well as a substantial proportion of world trade, particularly in wines and spirits, the products that were the subject of this negotiation. These Members were independent and active proponents of a register of geographical indications (GIs) for wines and spirits, and had submitted this paper to respond constructively to the four questions circulated by the Chair on 2 October. Before going through the questions one by one, he wanted to give Members a brief overview of the paper.
7. Regarding the Chair's first two questions concerning the consequences that should flow from notifying a term to the register, the paper simply noted that there were two general approaches to this question. One proposed that an entry on the register should result in better information being made available to and used by decision-makers in national systems, while the other approach relied on a legal presumption. The paper set out three reasons why a legal presumption was not acceptable to the group sponsoring the paper, namely because a legal presumption would increase protection rather than facilitate it, because a legal presumption would violate the principle of territoriality and because a legal presumption would alter the balance of rights and obligations in TRIPS. Therefore, as a legal presumption was not acceptable, the paper suggested that an obligation to consult the register when making decisions regarding GIs and trademarks for wines and spirits would ensure that better information was available to domestic decision-makers and would facilitate the protection of GIs notified to the register.
8. Regarding the Chair's second question concerning the significance and weight that domestic decision makers should give to the information on the register, he said the paper suggested that this question could not be answered in a vacuum and that Members needed to exchange information on how decision-makers in domestic systems would implement an obligation to consult the register. Once there was greater understanding of different systems, it might be possible to identify some common elements that could provide greater specificity to the obligation.
9. Regarding the Chair's third and fourth questions concerning participation and special and differential treatment, the paper suggested in paragraphs 6-9 that these two issues were closely interrelated. In the view of the sponsors of the paper mandatory participation was not a credible option, as it was plainly contrary to the mandate which made provision for non-participating Members. Seeking to change the mandate was not a constructive path for this negotiating group to take, as this negotiation was no different to any other part of the Doha Development Round. The only logical and equitable mechanism that met the mandate's requirement for participating and non-participating Members was voluntary participation, which also had the significant advantage of providing simple and effective special and differential treatment.
