160. The representative of Australia said that his delegation's thoughts were similar to those expressed by the delegation of Chinese Taipei. These other issues needed to be considered holistically as part of a fully developed proposal because domestic costs would affect implementation and the way that the legal effects would operate in practice.
161. He said that an implementing authority or an implementing system might face a choice that some Members who had no particular interest in wine and spirit trade would perhaps rather avoid. It was an invidious choice between having a system that allowed the debate mentioned in the examples of "Chianti" in Ruritania, or "Bordeaux" in Australia, and not having such a system. Some Members might have procedures providing for debates when considering whether a GI met the definition, whether the prima facie evidence could be turned down by proof to the contrary, but other Members might not have such rather costly procedures and might accept a term that was on the list as a matter of course. In the latter case, there would in fact be an almost automatic approval of any listing of a GI. While that might not seem of great consequence and would probably be referred to as "a matter for domestic systems", the WTO Members should be mindful that granting monopolies that should not exist would in fact raise costs to consumers, since monopolies, even on a geographical term, would create pricing power. His delegation was concerned about the risk of setting up unwarranted barriers to trade through introducing the system the European Communities had outlined. In contrast, under the joint proposal, a Member with no interest in the register would not need to participate: Members would therefore have an extremely low-cost alternative, which would not create monopolies that would not have been granted if there had been a procedure to examine the cases.
